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The BRICS Effect: Impacts of 
South–South Cooperation in 
the Social Field of International 
Development Cooperation*
Geovana Zoccal Gomes1 and Paulo Esteves2
Abstract The growing number of development stakeholders and initiatives 
in developing countries has added complexity to international development 
cooperation (IDC). Recipient countries have witnessed the increasing 
presence of emerging countries such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa), offering South–South cooperation as an 
alternative model for development. We call the impact of the new practices 
of South–South cooperation providers on the prevailing IDC structure the 
‘BRICS effect’ – an effect that ultimately destabilises established positions 
and interaction patterns between agents, and even between traditional 
donors and recipients. Combining the Bourdieusian notion of social fields 
with international relations (IR) perspectives on the changing geopolitics 
of international aid, this article discusses how the BRICS effect challenges 
established principles and practices from the field of IDC, indicating at least 
three dimensions: (1) new positions beyond the donor vs recipient dyad; 
(2) new modes of development cooperation; and (3) transformation of 
institutional architecture and governance mechanisms.
Keywords: South–South cooperation, development, international 
cooperation, Pierre Bourdieu, BRICS, OECD, DAC.
1 Introduction 
Donors that are not members of  the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), also known as ‘non-DAC donors’ or 
‘emerging donors’, have shaken the international aid landscape 
in recent years. Indeed, the footprints of  emerging donors within 
the development cooperation landscape are becoming increasingly 
significant. While a United Nations Economic and Social Council 
report estimated that in 2006 these contributions ranged from 7.8 per 
cent to 9.8 per cent of  all international aid, the OECD reported that 
non-DAC countries’ contributions reached 18.7 per cent in 2014 and 
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15.8 per cent in 2015 (ECOSOC 2008; OECD 2017b: 156). These 
figures are, at once, somewhat equivocal and highly revealing. The 
standards and methodologies for measuring non-DAC development 
cooperation contributions are extremely heterogeneous. Furthermore, 
many emerging donors neither report to the OECD-DAC nor share 
a common set of  definitions or parameters.3 Development experts 
frequently attribute the inaccuracy of  these figures to a lack of  
transparency on the part of  emerging donors (OECD 2011b; Ciommo 
2017), but while the figures may hide the true foothold of  emerging 
donors within the development aid system, they also reveal the erosion 
of  the system itself. Most non-DAC countries neither identify themselves 
as donors nor consider their development cooperation practices as 
equivalent to official development assistance (ODA).4 On the contrary, 
most non-DAC providers identify themselves as development partners 
and classify their practices under the umbrella of  South–South 
cooperation (SSC). Against this backdrop, both the act of  alluding to 
SSC partners as ‘emerging donors’ and the measurement activities 
such as those conducted by the OECD-DAC are not so much technical 
exercises as political attempts to subsume SSC to the existing aid 
structure. Hence, rather than revealing a lack of  transparency on the 
part of  SSC partners, these attempts to frame and measure SSC under 
the established categories of  ODA are indicative of  a political dispute 
within the development aid landscape. 
This article tries to understand how the emergence of  SSC partnerships 
has impacted upon the field of  international development cooperation 
(IDC). To do so, we draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological toolbox 
and the bourgeoning Bourdieu-inspired approaches in international 
studies to assess how the rise of  new agents within a given social field 
may transform the structures of  the field itself.5 As Richard Ashley 
rightly points out, Bourdieu’s toolbox allows us to understand social 
structures like the social field of  IDC as ‘arbitrary and contingent effects 
that are imposed in history, through practice, and to the exclusion of  
other ways of  structuring collective existence’ (1989: 253). Indeed, 
this sociological approach serves to make inroads into understanding 
how emerging Southern development partners are being constituted 
as agents and authorised to play specific roles within a field structured, 
so far, around traditional donorship. Furthermore, Bourdieu’s toolbox 
allows us to address the power struggles embedded (and hidden) within 
such apparently ordinary and technical activities as categorisation 
(e.g. emerging donors, non-DAC donors) and measurement (e.g. ODA 
from non-DAC donors). 
The concept of  the social field is our entry point for assessing 
the impacts of  SSC partnerships on established international aid 
structures. A social field is composed of  a number of  agents that 
interact according to different hierarchies of  power. Hence, it is under 
constant transformation, and IDC, when understood as a social 
field, is no different (Fonseca 2014; Gomes 2013).6 In this social field, 
the agents have well-structured positions and a specific pattern of  
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relationships through which they interact with each other: official 
development assistance (ODA). The social relations among the agents 
are circumscribed by a common understanding of  the rules, which can 
be articulated either formally or informally (Bourdieu 1990). The agents 
occupy hierarchical positions defined by authorised and legitimised 
forms of  capital. Each field follows a specific logic and ascribes value to 
capital in distinct ways.7 It is the distribution of  this capital that permits 
or restricts agents’ capacity to exert power and influence on the field 
(Bourdieu 1990; Leander 2008).
We contend that in the last two decades we have witnessed growing 
competition, and sometimes even contestation, between established and 
emerging powers over their set positions. From the perspective of  IDC, 
the emergence of  SSC has decentred and transformed the practices 
adopted by traditional donors, moving the boundaries of  the field of  
IDC away from the strict lines drawn up with the concept of  ODA. 
In this article, we call the impact of  SSC practices on the prevailing 
structures in the field of  IDC the ‘BRICS effect’. 
The BRICS effect ultimately destabilises established positions and 
interaction patterns between agents, even between traditional donors 
and recipients. As this article tries to demonstrate, the BRICS effect 
comprises at least three dimensions: (1) the articulation of  new positions 
beyond the donor/recipient dyad; (2) the induction of  new modes of  
development cooperation; and (3) the transformation of  the institutional 
architecture and governance mechanisms in the field of  IDC. The 
remainder of  this article comprises four sections. Section 2 presents a 
historical redescription of  the field of  IDC and the emergence of  SSC 
in the light of  Bourdieu’s concepts. This is necessary to set the stage for 
the analysis we conduct in Section 3, in which we present the BRICS 
effect as an analytical tool and unpack the impacts of  the rise of  SSC 
upon the field of  IDC. Finally, in Section 4 we seek to advance some 
preliminary conclusions, suggesting that the BRICS effect has eroded 
the established boundaries of  the field of  IDC, scrambling long-held 
positions and mixing development cooperation with a growing variety 
of  development flows.
2 The field of international development cooperation and the rise of 
South–South cooperation 
Even though foreign assistance activities date long before, it was only 
in the aftermath of  the Second World War and the Bretton Woods 
Conference that a framework for international aid started to be 
drawn up. The emergence of  development aid as a set of  practices 
was conditioned by the bipolar core of  the international system and 
by the national liberation movements at its periphery. Under these 
circumstances, development aid was underpinned by modernisation 
theories (Rostow 1960; Finnemore 1997; Rist 2008; Pieterse 2010) 
and became an important foreign policy tool for expanding the areas 
of  influence of  the major world powers (Antonini and Hirst 2009; 
Mawdsley 2012; Gu, Shankland and Chennoy 2016). Notwithstanding 
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their role in advancing Western interests in general and the US liberal 
agenda in particular (Ruggie 1982), modernisation theories also 
contributed to the consolidation of  spatial–temporal dynamics which 
ultimately enabled agency within the field of  IDC (Kapoor 2008). 
The dichotomies of  centre versus periphery and developed versus 
underdeveloped unfolded into the positions and roles of  donor versus 
recipient within the field of  IDC. Modernisation theories reinforced 
an authoritative position from which former Western imperial powers 
could keep a quasi-tutelary position with their former colonies 
(Grovogui 2001; Kothari 2005). This so-called scientific body of  
knowledge supported a practical belief, a ‘set of  instituted dogmas and 
doctrines’ (Bourdieu 1990: 68), enabling a specific set of  practices, later 
called official development assistance. ODA was then defined as
government aid designed to promote the economic development 
and welfare of  developing countries. Loans and credits for military 
purposes are excluded. Aid may be provided bilaterally, from donor 
to recipient, or channelled through a multilateral development 
agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank. Aid includes 
grants, ‘soft’ loans (where the grant element is at least 25% of  
the total) and the provision of  technical assistance. The OECD 
maintains a list of  developing countries and territories; only aid to 
these countries counts as ODA (OECD 2015).
The establishment of  ODA set the boundaries of  the field of  IDC, 
distinguishing its specific practices from other economic flows, such 
as trade or investments. Furthermore, the concept of  ODA fixed the 
hierarchical positions of  donor and recipient within the same field. A 
‘stage of  development’ became a vantage point from which donors 
could assert what policies and development paths were right for the ‘less 
developed’ recipient countries. The donorship credo embraced a notion 
of  responsibility in which ‘advanced’ or ‘industrialised’ economies 
became responsible for international development and for promoting 
‘economic development and welfare of  developing countries’. Bourdieu 
has called this kind of  practical belief  ‘doxa’. Doxa ultimately enables 
agency, generates classificatory schemas, structures positions, and 
guides practices, which become naturalised over time (Bigo 2011). The 
donorship doxa was gradually taken for granted and ODA became 
its main doxic practice.8 Moreover, the donorship doxa transformed a 
contingent and arbitrary choice into a necessary requirement, thereby 
excluding other policy options which did not follow the generally 
accepted credo. Considering that objective relations structure the social 
field and the positions occupied by agents, it is possible to argue that the 
field of  IDC was consolidated when this system of  oppositions between 
‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ gained force (Mawdsley 2012).
Doxa refers to the specific experience of  the moment when objective 
order and subjective organisational principles are in a quasi-perfect 
correspondence, making the natural world and the social world 
seem self-evident. It represents an absolute recognition of  legitimacy, 
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without, however, any recognition of  arbitrariness, and generates a 
spontaneous and widely held idea of  what is taken for granted. In this 
logic, unspoken knowledge is what constitutes social reality, meaning 
the fundamental structures of  a social field which themselves exercise a 
sort of  structural power over the practices within the field. The field of  
IDC is therefore organised around the donorship doxa, which establishes 
specific positions, responsibilities, and roles for developed and 
developing countries as either donors or recipients. ODA has become 
the key practice within the field, bringing together donors and recipients 
around the development credo. Through the strategic mobilisation of  
the forms of  capital at stake, the agents engage in a constant battle for 
the doxa of  a specific field (Guzzini 2000; Bourdieu 1977; Berling 2012). 
The institutional structure of  the field of  IDC has also followed the 
donorship doxa. Indeed, since the 1960s the frontiers and practices of  
the field have been defined by a small group of  key donors, members 
of  the DAC. The DAC was built from an earlier institution, the 
Development Assistance Group (DAG), when the OECD was created. 
DAG was a consultation forum established in early 1960 among the 
main donors under the leadership of  the USA during the Dwight D. 
Eisenhower administration. DAC replaced DAG in September 1961 
with the main goal of  defining and monitoring global patterns of  
international development in key areas. 
Donation within the framework of  ODA, performed along the 
North–South axis, has become the normal and expected behaviour 
of  a developed country within the field of  IDC. Nevertheless, the 
consolidation of  this field is itself  the result of  a doxic battle. Indeed, 
as seen above, while donorship might be considered a by-product of  
the Cold War and a fixture at the heart of  the international system, it 
was also a response for the national liberation movements that were 
mushrooming at the periphery. These movements not only defied 
colonial rule but also challenged the structural inequalities which 
underpinned donorship practices.9 At the periphery, Southern countries 
articulated a new narrative around the concepts of  individual and 
collective self-reliance, emphasising autonomy or self-determination 
and non-intervention as key dimensions of  development cooperation. 
This SSC narrative was articulated both as a political tool to reinforce 
national liberation movements and as an alternative to the emerging 
donorship doxa. Although the burgeoning field of  IDC was structured 
around this doxa, it was challenged from inside by Southern countries 
keen to assert two new modes of  development cooperation: Technical 
Cooperation among Developing Countries and Economic Cooperation 
among Developing Countries, both under the umbrella of  SSC, as 
discussed below. Furthermore, while the donorship doxa articulated 
Southern countries’ positions as recipients, the SSC narrative was a way 
for them to renegotiate their positions in the field of  IDC, setting the 
limits of  the donorship doxa while calling for more horizontal patterns 
of  relationship. 
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Keen to enhance their capital and maximise their interests (whether 
symbolic or material) in the international arena, countries from the global 
South began to articulate their own strategies and initiatives, envisioning 
more autonomous avenues towards development: the Non-Alignment 
Movement, the launch of  the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the inception of  the G77 and the Declaration on 
the Establishment of  a New International Economic Order (Mawdsley 
2012; Esteves and Assunção 2014; Toye 2014). The tensions between 
developed and developing countries gave rise to the North–South 
debate, through which the global South aimed to expand its influence 
on the rules of  the international order (Hurrel and Woods 1999; Woods 
1999). Under the umbrella of  UNDP, the Buenos Aires Action Plan 
(1978) focused on the promotion and implementation of  technical 
cooperation among developing countries, forming the first framework 
in which the term ‘horizontal cooperation’ was used, as opposed to 
the vertical notion of  cooperation that traditionally predominated in 
North–South cooperation (UN 1978; UNDP 1994; Mawdsley 2012; 
Gu 2017). While the Buenos Aires Action Plan consolidated Technical 
Cooperation among Developing Countries as one form of  SSC, the 
G77 recognised Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries in 
1981 at the Caracas Programme of  Action on Economic Cooperation 
among Developing Countries as another legitimate practice for fostering 
development among Southern countries (UN 1978; G77 1981). Even 
if  SSC partners lacked the material capacities to implement these 
programmes in any significant way, the establishment of  these modes 
of  cooperation became a landmark in the field of  IDC, stressing the 
differences between hierarchical donorship practices and the supposedly 
horizontal forms of  SSC.
The 2000s witnessed a weakening of  the imposition of  conditionalities. 
The demise of  the Washington Consensus accompanied the rise of  
new powers, such as China and India. In this context, policies favouring 
structural reforms lost ground. Moreover, even while recognising that 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth was an important component 
of  development policies, new agents in the field were keen to stress the 
need to expand the development agenda (Stiglitz 2003). Dissatisfied 
with many of  the results of  ODA, middle-income countries kept up 
the pressure for increased participation and involvement for Southern 
countries in the field of  IDC. 
The Paris Declaration may be seen as an attempt to rebuild the 
field’s boundaries in a context of  increasing contestation and 
declining legitimacy of  donors’ practices (Esteves and Assunção 
2014). Indeed, the final document of  the second High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness, which took place within the scope of  the 
OECD, introduced the principles of  harmonisation, alignment, and 
coordination as essential for the effectiveness of  international aid. The 
declaration stressed the principle of  ownership, highlighting the ways 
donors and recipient countries relate to each other (OECD 2008).
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Even with greater emphasis on the principle of  ownership, the donorship 
doxa was not able to redress structural asymmetries and the power games 
played among donors and recipients. For many developing countries, 
donors’ practices were still seen as ways to influence or impose a 
predetermined agenda on recipient countries or even smaller donors 
(Eyben 2010). In this context, SSC was put forward as an alternative way 
to foster development – a set of  practices free from conditionalities and 
based upon horizontal and mutually beneficial results.
Despite the growing relevance of  SSC, it was only in 2008, at the High 
Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness in Accra (Accra HLF), that 
these practices were recognised as a constitutive and legitimate part 
of  the field of  IDC. The Accra Agenda for Action recommended that 
developing countries should strengthen their capacity to conduct and 
manage development through strong institutions and local expertise, 
counting not only on traditional cooperation, but also on SSC, 
which was recognised as ‘a valuable complement to North–South 
co-operation’ (OECD 2008: 18).
3 The BRICS effect
During the 2000s, rising powers started to play an increasingly 
important role within the field of  IDC. Their main impact on the 
field was the recognition of  SSC as a legitimate set of  practices. 
While the Accra HLF mentioned SSC for the first time, the Nairobi 
outcome document of  the High-level UN Conference on South–South 
Cooperation re-established the principles of  SSC in line with the 
concepts set forth in the Paris Declaration. If, as discussed above, the 
Paris Declaration can be seen as a response to the eroding legitimacy 
of  donor practices (particularly conditionalities) and to the rise of  new 
donors, the Accra HLF and the Nairobi outcome document constitute 
an attempt to introduce SSC partnerships into the donorship doxa. From 
Accra and Nairobi on, the effects of  the rise of  SSC within the field of  
IDC became more acute. 
We call these movements of  competition and differentiation within 
the field of  IDC the BRICS effect.10 This analytical tool allows us to 
understand the multidimensional impacts generated by the rise of  
SSC in the field and the interplay between two distinct but articulated 
dynamics: competition and differentiation. For Bourdieu, competition 
struggles are not designed to transform the principles, but to modify 
the positions of  the agents in the field. Struggles for differentiation, 
on the other hand, are aimed at transforming the current legitimate 
definition of  reality in a given field, subverting the established order 
(Bourdieu 1990). By emphasising an alternative set of  principles, SSC 
partnerships do not compete to occupy established positions; indeed, 
they generate an original narrative in which different positions are 
articulated. Meanwhile, the attempts by traditional donors to bring SSC 
into the established structure of  the field indicate a struggle to establish 
a competitive environment, where traditional donors and agents of  
SSC play under the same rules. In any case, the interplay between 
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competition and differentiation decentres the entire field, challenging 
the donorship doxa, displacing the monopolistic position of  traditional 
donors at its core and multiplying the practices considered legitimate by 
its agents. Hence, the BRICS effect is a multidimensional phenomenon, 
comprising: (1) the articulation of  new positions beyond the donor 
vs recipient dyad; (2) the induction of  new modes of  development 
cooperation; and (3) the transformation of  the institutional architecture 
and governance mechanisms in the field of  IDC.
The creation of  the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-operation (GPEDC) is the most important outcome of  the rising 
powers’ foothold in the field of  IDC. It was established at the fourth 
HLF on Aid Effectiveness, held in 2011 in Busan, South Korea (OECD 
2011a). Reinforcing the importance of  SSC agents, the meeting 
addressed the need to enlarge the participation of  the various actors and 
practices in the field of  IDC, highlighting at the same time the principle 
of  ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. The main priority of  the 
GPEDC was the inclusion and representativeness of  emergent actors. 
The Busan Forum may be seen as the ‘beginning of  the end’ of  a 
development governance controlled by the West (Mawdsley 2012).
Nevertheless, it is necessary to bear in mind that despite claiming 
common principles for a new model of  international cooperation – 
such as non-interference in internal matters, no conditionalities, and a 
demand-driven approach – SSC is not a homogeneous set of  practices. 
As early as 2006, Richard Manning, former president of  OECD-DAC, 
presented an effort to map out the diversity among the agents of  
SSC. During a lecture at the UK Overseas Development Institute, he 
presented four categories of  emerging donors: (1) OECD members 
that are not part of  DAC, such as Mexico; (2) new EU members, who 
are not part of  the OECD; (3) Middle Eastern countries which are 
members of  the Organization of  the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC); and (4) emerging donors that are not members of  OECD, such 
as Brazil, China, and India (Manning 2006).
New EU members are not opposed to the current international aid 
system, and are looking forward to joining it, not reforming it. Arab 
donors have their own model, which does not correspond to but also 
does not cast into question the practices of  OECD-DAC. Hence, the 
tensions over the boundaries of  the field of  IDC and its doxa are caused 
by the struggle of  those disputing the DAC model: the fourth group 
demarcated by Richard Manning.
These countries position themselves as providers of  a different 
model of  development assistance, a model based on more equal 
partnerships that encompass not only technical and financial 
assistance, but also strengthened trade and investment, and on the 
sharing of  knowledge and experiences that are closer to, and more 
relevant for, the low-income countries that they provide assistance to 
(de Renzio and Seifert 2014: 1865).
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The cleavage between the OECD-based GPEDC and the United 
Nations Development Cooperation Forum is indicative of  a process of  
differentiation within the field of  IDC. New development cooperation 
providers from outside the OECD which do not identify themselves 
with the donor position tend to question the legitimacy of  the 
Global Partnership. This group of  new providers has put pressure 
on the frontiers of  the field while establishing new flows of  expertise, 
goods, and investments as legitimate practices. Northern donors 
are no longer alone, and ODA is no longer the only legitimate form 
of  development assistance. While emerging powers have exerted 
external pressure to establish their positions and consolidate their 
practices, traditional donors have seen their monopolistic positions 
challenged and the borders of  the field disputed. This has led to an 
effort advanced by the OECD-DAC to attract the new agents, SSC 
practitioners, to its own umbrella of  common practices, specifically 
those involving quantification, monitoring, evaluation, and the Aid 
Effectiveness agenda.
On the one hand, OECD-DAC has established mechanisms such as the 
China-DAC study group in a bid to share its own practices with new 
agents. On the other, traditional donors such as the UK and Germany 
have modified their own strategies towards emerging countries, 
introducing new triangular cooperation programmes. It is possible to 
regard both of  these strategies as forms of  advocacy designed to align 
the new practices and modalities with the Aid Effectiveness agenda 
and to co-opt Southern agents to adjust their actions to the traditional 
practices from the field of  IDC. This situation would seem to confirm 
the theoretical assumption that new agents should adapt to existing 
norms within the field. 
These attempts to co-opt emerging countries into traditional practices 
can be observed in various fields, such as the climate change agenda. 
The failure of  the Kyoto Protocol is allegedly due to the unwillingness 
of  emerging countries to shoulder their burden of  responsibility for 
mitigation or adaptation. The final document from COP 21, the 
Paris Agreement, itself  builds on a bottom-up methodology, allowing 
countries to join efforts to address climate change, spreading the burden 
of  mitigation and adaptation beyond just industrialised countries. 
Another example from the development agenda is the construction of  
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), based on the principle of  
universality. Oddly, UN Resolution A/RES/70/1, which outlines the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, reaffirms the principle of  
common but differentiated responsibilities. Nevertheless, departing from 
the principle of  universality, the SDGs set international goals to be met 
by all countries, not only from the developing world. This suggests that 
‘we are all developing countries now’ (Esteves 2017) and that developed 
and developing countries must share responsibility for climate change 
and development. 
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While there seems to be a trend for the agents of  SSC to adapt to 
the established doxa of  the field of  IDC, the actual practices and 
doxa of  the field are themselves in flux. The notion of  differentiation 
developed by Bourdieu thus appears to be the second effect brought 
by the increasingly strengthened agency of  the BRICS in the field. 
Different agents are starting to develop their own patterns to deal with 
international development, eroding the entire field.
The concept of  ODA put agents in the position of  donors or recipients, 
where donors had responsibilities towards recipient countries and 
international development, demarcating the legitimised practices of  
the field. In October 1970, the UN called for countries to allocate 
0.7 per cent of  their gross national income (GNI) to ODA. However, 
very few countries have actually reached this goal. According to 2017 
data, Norway, Luxemburg, Sweden, Denmark, and the UK are the 
only countries allocating 0.7 per cent or more of  their GNI to ODA. 
Moreover, the DAC members’ net ODA represented 0.31 per cent of  
their total GNI (OECD n.d.), one of  the highest levels since 2005.
Nevertheless, this concept has been transformed over time and has 
lost ground in recent years. There has been an attempt to stretch the 
concept of  ODA, which has also come to be understood as a flow that 
allows donors to invest in public–private partnerships, for instance, in 
order to lessen the risks of  private investment in developing countries. 
Also, in-donor expenditure on refugees beyond the one-year term 
normally imposed has been included in calculations of  ODA (Esteves 
2017). Related to the dwindling importance of  ODA, the struggle 
by emerging countries for differentiation can be observed in the 
formulation of  a new statistical measurement framework, the Total 
Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD). TOSSD is 
based on the notion of  measuring all development flows contributing 
to sustainable development, which include private investments and 
non-concessional loans, making ODA just one of  many other flows 
contributing to the achievement of  the SDGs (Besharati 2017). 
Surprisingly, the TOSSD proposals include the principle of  mutual 
benefits, which is one of  the SSC principles defined in the 2009 Nairobi 
Declaration, and which has been highly criticised by many traditional 
donors as a way of  doing business under a rhetoric of  fostering 
development. This indicates a remarkable transformation in the 
practices and doxa of  the field, as traditional donors are having to adapt 
to new modes of  behaviour put forward by emerging countries and SSC 
agreements, and not the other way around. 
4 Concluding remarks: is the field of IDC in decline? 
After decades of  prominent discourse about development, there is no 
more place for innocence (Ribeiro 2007: 275).
Particularly since the end of  the 1990s, the field of  IDC has become a 
true battlefield (Esteves and Assunção 2014) in which the Western-centric 
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discourse on international development, grounded strongly in a belief  
in linear progress, has been questioned and defied. The purposes 
and practices considered legitimate by the ODA framework since 
its demarcation by the OECD-DAC are no longer seen as being as 
representative and credible as they were when it was first defined.
At the beginning of  the 2000s, development agents had to deal with 
an increasingly contested field. Both the donor positions and the 
practices of  donorship were disputed. In addition, the fundamental 
goals of  development policies and the ways to achieve them became 
problematic… This doxic battle had a germane effect on the field, 
since it drew attention to its borders, problematising what would be 
considered legitimate practices within the international development 
field (Esteves and Assunção 2014: 1781).
Traditional donors now need to accommodate the major new forces 
operating in the field of  IDC. If  there ever was a clear division 
between developed and underdeveloped, or donor and recipient, which 
determined the zones of  dominance in the field, now this distinction is 
significantly blurred. Moreover, new agents such as transnational social 
movements and the private sector have been incorporated into the field. 
Interestingly, these transformations in the configuration of  the capital 
and relative positions in the field have not only been seen between 
traditional and emerging donors.
At the same time as the borders and doxa of  the field of  IDC have been 
challenged, the legitimacy of  the agency of  Southern actors has also 
been contested. Domestically, many of  these countries still face struggles 
against poverty and inequality, making it hard for them to justify their 
new international role to their own people. Internationally, although 
they have devised joint strategies that have put pressure on the current 
order, these agents do not form a homogeneous or cohesive group.
Countries such as Mexico or South Korea, despite positioning 
themselves as agents of  SSC, have joined the OECD and adopted 
its principles. This group are in a competitive struggle to increase 
their capital, but are not yet in a position to contest the status quo. 
Meanwhile, countries such as Brazil and India have repeatedly stood 
up against the traditional principles of  cooperation. In a bid for 
differentiation, they are keen to challenge the value of  the prevailing 
forms of  capital, practices, and borders in the field of  IDC.11
Analyses focusing on struggles in the field of  IDC indicate that the 
consolidation of  SSC has brought to the fore considerable tension over 
the frontiers of  and practices in the field. As the analysis of  the BRICS 
effect has revealed, these tensions are manifested at the same time 
in terms of  positions, practices, and institutional arrangements. The 
historical redescription shows that the practical logics, the configuration 
of  capital relevant to the field, and the relative positions occupied 
by agents have been in constant transformation since the first time 
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the boundaries of  the doxa in the field of  IDC were set. Considering 
Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) indication that doxa is a quasi‑perfect 
correspondence between the objective order and the subjective 
organisational principles of  a social field, and bearing in mind that the 
field of  IDC has been marked by a trajectory of  constant tussles over 
its guiding principles, it is worth questioning whether or not the agents 
within the field will be able to keep its borders any wider than the doxa 
of  donorship. 
The field of  IDC was consolidated under the dichotomy of  developed 
versus developing countries, positioning agents as either donors or 
recipient countries. The positions the countries occupy in the field and 
the amount and type of  capital they possess also inform the received 
assumptions about the practices in the field. This is what gives agents 
the authority to act and lay down the rules of  the field for some but not 
for others. 
The presence of  SSC agents that do not follow traditional practices has 
put some strain on the doxa and stretched the boundaries of  the field. 
The demand for an alternative, such as the creation of  new multilateral 
banks, indicates that the field has become decentred. In 2016, global 
ODA was worth a total of  US$142.6bn, its highest level since the turn 
of  the twenty-first century (OECD 2017a). Nevertheless, if  the SDGs 
are to be reached, cooperation must rise from billions to trillions, but 
this can only be done if  private investments are brought into play. 
Hence, contrary to what might have been expected – that new agents 
would adapt to the existing framework as they jockeyed for positions 
in the field – what is actually happening is that traditional donors are 
adapting to the ways of  Southern agents and the new approaches they 
have introduced. 
Notes
*  This article was produced as part of  the project ‘Brazil, the BRICS 
and International Cooperation for Development’ funded by the Rio 
de Janeiro state funding agency, FAPERJ (CNE E-26/201.386/2014), 
with additional support from the Brazilian postgraduate education 
and research agency, CNPq. Previous versions were presented at the 
Development Studies Association 2016 Annual Conference and at an 
IDS Members’ Seminar in 2017.
1 Geovana Zoccal Gomes is a PhD candidate at the Institute of  
International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of  Rio de 
Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio), Brazil, and a researcher at the BRICS Policy 
Center, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
2 Paulo Esteves is an Associate Professor at the Institute of  
International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of  Rio de 
Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio), Brazil, Director of  the BRICS Policy 
Center, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Fellow at the Institute for 
Advanced Sustainability Studies, Potsdam, Germany.
3 For a comprehensive review of  existing definitions and methods, see 
Silva et al. (2016).
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4 Given the differences between DAC and non-DAC countries, 
the latter are currently trying to develop their own standards for 
measuring development cooperation. See Corrêa (2017).
5 On the value added by Bourdieu-inspired approaches in international 
studies, see Berling (2012), Leander (2008), and Guzzini (2006).
6 The social field is a sphere of  action, a locus of  social phenomena, 
a structured and abstract space of  social positions, a space in 
which agents occupy distinct positions in relation to one another. 
It is organised around structuring axes that constitute the space of  
related defined positions; i.e. agents’ social positions are defined in 
accordance with their relations (Bourdieu 1990). The field allows 
the social world to be divided into sub-systems, which are to some 
extent autonomous in their own logical practices, the result of  a 
historical process of  autonomisation. To analyse situations happening 
in the field it is necessary to first analyse the field itself. Nevertheless, 
autonomy should not be seen as a synonym of  independence or 
an a priori fact. It is first and foremost a methodological principle 
grounded in the assumption that it is necessary to empirically define 
an object of  study. The field always exists in a context involving other 
fields and its logic will be continually influenced by other fields’ logics 
(Criado 2008; Leander 2008).
7 Each field ascribes different values to different kinds of  capital, 
following a specific logic defined by the field. Capital may be 
material, like private property, economic capital, or a degree, but 
it can equally be symbolic, collectively recognised and authorised 
(Bourdieu 1990).
8 On doxic practices, see Guzzini (2006) and Leander (2008).
9 Dependency theory, for instance, emerged in the 1960s, and drew 
attention to the imperial exploitation of  the periphery and the 
reproduction of  structural inequalities. Despite its self-centred 
(nationalistic) perspective on accumulation, dependency theory 
agrees with economic development and capital accumulation. It was 
the alternative development thinking of  the 1970s that assimilated 
‘human flourishing’, focused on social and collective development 
(Pieterse 2010).
10 Rather than referring to the BRICS countries or BRICS as a group, 
the BRICS effect alludes to a general perception of  the end of  the 
unipolar moment and the establishment of  alternative poles of  
power, economic dynamism, and normative entrepreneurship.
11 One reflex of  this dispute is the aforementioned engagement in 
the Global Partnership. While Southern countries that are OECD 
members defend participation in the GPEDC, agents such as Brazil 
identify the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNDCF) 
as the legitimate forum, as it is under the UN system (cf. Esteves and 
Assunção 2014).
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